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A characteristic shared by many if not most of the world’s developing
countries is the relatively unfavorable price relationships faced by farmers.
It is not uncommon for farm product prices to be held below world market
levels by government imposed ceiling prices or by taxes on farm output or
exports. In addition the prices of modern farm inputs such as fertilizer
are frequently kept at artificially high levels through levies or embargoes
on imports. Although there appears to be some awareness, at least among
a few economists, that such policies have reduced the growth of food pro-
duction in the world, there is little hard evidence on the magnitude of
1/
this reduction and the resulting social cost of these policies.—
With this paper I shall try to make a modest contribution along these
lines by measuring the social cost of a price policy which has made it
unprofitable for Argentine farmers to utilize nitrogen fertilizer in the
production of corn. This is not an attempt to single out Argentine policy
for special criticism. The same type of analysis could (and probably
should) be carried out for a number of other countries and commodities.
The effect of unfavorable farm prices is especially revealing in Argentina,
however, because of its rich agricultural land, skilled farmers, an
established agricultural research system, and an industrial sector capable
of supplying modern inputs to agriculture given the proper incentives.
* University of Minnesota-2-
Relative Prices
Whether one chooses to say that corn is underpriced in Argentina or
nitrogen is overpriced depends a great deal on the exchange rate used. For
example, in the spring of 1972 Argentine farmers received about 25 old
pesos per kilo for corn. As shown in table 1, this translates in $1.06 per
bushel using the then official 600 peso per dollar rate of exchange. At
this time U.S. farmers were receiving $1.10 per bushel. However, the
official Argentine policy of overvaluing the peso relative to the dollar
Table 1. Dollar Prices of Corn and Nitrogen, Argentina and the United
States (Farm Level, March 1972)
Corn ($ per bu.)g’ Nitrogen ($ per lb.)
Exchange rate Argentina Us. Argentina U.S.
600 pesos/dollar $1.06 $1.10 $.13 $.09
950 pesos/dollar .67 1.10 .09 l 09
~/ From urea.
Sources: Argentina corn prices from Buenos Aires market quotations
(March 15, 1972) deducting 4 pesos per kilo from the price
of corn for transportation and marketing charges. Argentine
nitrogen prices quoted at Pergamino, 2001-400 kg. purchase
of urea, payable in 180 days. U.S. prices from Agricultural
Prices, Dec. 1972.
resulted in an unofficial or black market exchange rate of about 950
pesos per dollar. At this exchange rate the dollar price of corn turns
out to be $.67 per bushel. In the case of nitrogen, the use of a 600
pesos per dollar exchange rate results in a relatively high price of
nitrogen in Argentina compared to the U.S., whereas the use of 950
black market rate causes the price of pure nitrogen from urea to be the
same in both countries.-3-
Of course, regardless of the exchange rate used, the price of corn
relative to the price of nitrogen remains unfavorable to Argentine farmers
compared to U.S. farmers. In fact, the figures presented in Table 1 grossly
understate the true difference in relative prices between the two countries
because urea is a much higher priced form of nitrogen in the U.S. than
anhydrous ammonia which is by far the main source of nitrogen for corn in the
corn belt. In the spring of 1972 U.S. farmers paid about $.05 per pound for
pure nitrogen from anhydrous ammonia compared to the $.09 price quoted in
table 1 for urea. On the other hand, urea was about the only form of nitrogen
available to Argentine farmers because of the special facilities required
to store anhydrous ammonia. The main purpose of Table 1 is to illustrate
how the comparison of output and input prices is affected by the use of
different exchange rates.
A more accurate and long run picture of the difference in relative prices
between the two countries is presented in Table 2. These figures denote the
pounds of corn required to purchase one pound of pure nitrogen at the farm
level from the cheapest source available. In the United States ammonium
nitrate provided the cheapest source available during the 1950-54 period,
and anhydrous ammonia during the remaining periods. Urea is used as the
nitrogen source in Argentina for the entire 25 year period.
Table 2. Pounds of Corn Required to Purchase One Pound of Pure Nitrogen






al Fertilizer rice data not available for the 1950-59 period.
5
Also fertilizer
~rices based on -year averages for the remaining periods; prices were not
available for 1960-61, 1965-66, and 1973-74.
Sources: Argentina prices from FAO Production Yearbook, various years. United
States prices from Agricultural Prices, various years. All prices quoted at
the farm level.-4-
There can be little doubt that the relatively low and declining real
price of nitrogen fertilizer in the United States has led to the widespread
and relatively large application of nitrogen to corn acreage. In 1964 about
85 percent of the area planted to corn in the major corn producing states
received an average of 58 pounds of pure nitrogen per acre (65
hectare). By 1973 these figures had increased to 95.9 percent




the situation in Argentina where virtually none (.2 percent) of the corn
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area recetves any nitrogen.— Since urea has been available to Argentine
farmers we may infer, in view of the unfavorable price relationships depicted
in Table 2, that they have not utilized nitrogen on corn because it has not
been profitable to do so.
The profitability of nitrogen application depends upon two factors:
1. the physical response of the corn plant to nitrogen application and
2. the relative prices of corn and nitrogen. Unless the marginal pound
(or kilo) of nitrogen adds at least as many pounds (or kilos) of corn required
to pay for the nitrogen, there is no economic incentive to use this input.
Nitrogen Response
Before examining the available evidence bearing on the responsiveness
of Argentine com to nitrogen fertilization it will be useful to briefly
call to mind the possible ways in which the corn plant may respond to
additional nitrogen. There are two possibilities: 1. multiple ears, and
2. a larger ear size or weight. We can dismhs the first possibility as being
very important, at
order for the corn
ability to produce
least with current corn varieties. This means that in
plant to respond to additional nitrogen it must have the
larger and heavier ears.-5-
In comparison to U.S. hybrids, Argentine corn varieties exhibit a
uniformly small ear size and weight under increasing doses of nitrogen
fertilization. As shown in Table 3, the average ear weight in terms of
grain remains relatively stable at about 100 grams per ear between zero and
150 kilograms of pure nitrogen per hectare (134 pounds per acre). In 1972,
corn plant populations in the U.S. corn belt averaged 18,175 plants per acre
(44,892 plants per hectare).!’ With a nitrogen application of 115 pounds
per acre (129 kg. per ha.), yields averaged 98.8 bushels per acre. Assuming
one ear per plant, this yield is equivalent to 138 grams of grain per ear.
In corn yield contests ear weight appears quite responsive to higher levels
of fertilization. For example, in 1975 a record breaking yield of 338 bushels
per acre was obtained in Illinois with a per acre plant population of 33,000
5/
and a nitrogen application of 400 pounds.— Again assuming one ear per plant,
ear weight in this case turns out to be 261 grams. Thus it appears that U.S.
hybrids are capable of responding to nitrogen fertilization to a much larger
extent than Argentine varieties.
Table 3. Average Ear Weight of Argentine Corn Varieties, INTA-CIMMYT-Ford
Foundation Experiments, 1968-69.
(Grams of grain)
Soil organic matter Nitrogen application (Kg/ha)
o 50 100 150 —.
: 3.5 percent 99 101 105 104
> 3.5 percent 102 106 101 98
Source: First annual report of the cooperative INTA-CIMMYT-Ford Foundation
Corn and wheat program, 1969. The experiments were conducted at 11 different
locations under varying soil types and moisture levels. Plant population
was held constant at 47,500 plants per hectare (19,230 per acre).-6-
In view of the rather small response of ear weight to nitrogen
application, one might conclude that there is little to be gained by applying
nitrogen to corn in Argentina. But this is not necessarily so. There is
still the possibility of increasing the plant population with higher levels
of fertilization.
in level of plant
Experiments which
Even if each plant is limited in its response, the increase
nutrients still can be utilized if there are more plants.
hold plant population constant while measuring the impact
of higher levels of fertilization in effect are holding too much constant.
If Argentina farmers found it profitable to apply nitrogen they most likely
would have increased plant populations similar to what U.S. farmers have
done. Between 1964 and 1974 average plant populations in the corn belt
increased by 33 percent, growing from 13,600 per acre (33,600 per hectare)
to 18,175 (44,900 per hectare):’ This occurred even though U.S. hybrids
respond to higher levels of fertilization by producing larger and heavier
ears.
The importance of plant population to nitrogen response in Argentina
is revealed by the figures in Table 4. At the 20,000 and 40,000 population
levels the marginal product of nitrogen is relatively small. Unless the
nitrogen/corn price ratio were less than 3.45 it would not pay to apply
nitrogen at the 40,000 per hectare population level. Although there are no
official statistics on actual Argentine plant populations, extension
personnel estimate the figure to be in the neighborhood of 45,000 plants per
hectare. With the nitrogen/corn price ratio averaging 9.5 over the 1950-74
period, there has been no incentive to utilize nitrogen. At the 50,000
population, the marginal product of nitrogen at the 30 kg./ha. level (10.47)
7/
is probably too close to the 9.5 price ratio to be worth taking the risk.—
Also the price ratio has fluctuated substantially between years which has
added to the risk.-7-


























Source: Lucio Reca, l’FertilizationNtrogenada en Maiz: Resultados e
Implicaciones ,1’Unpublished manuscript, Buenos Aires, Argentina 1970, p.7.
Estimates made from a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Social Cost
By maintaining an unfavorable nitrogen/corn price ratio to farmers, the
Argentine government in effect made the decision to reduce Argentine corn
production by millions of bushels over the 1950-74 period. Of course, this
decision also meant that domestic resources or foreign exchange did not have
to be allocated to the production or purchase of nitrogen fertilizer. However,
as will now be shown, the value of corn given up by not allowing the use of
nitrogen greatly exceeded the total cost of the nitrogen resulting in a
substantial social cost to the country.
In order to measure the social cost of this policy to Argentina, two
pieces of information are required: 1. the potential nitrogen/corn price-8-
ratio which could have existed in the absense of market distortions, and
2. the response of Argentine corn varieties to nitrogen fertilizer. The
U.S. price ratios presented in Table 2 are utilized as estimates of the
potential ratfos which could have existed in Argentina in the absense of
market distortions. The nitrogen and corn prices faced by U.S. farmers are
fairly close to world market prices after transportation and marketing
\
charges are added to nitrogen and subtracted from corn. This assumes that
storage facilities for anhydrous ammonia would have been constructed in
Argentina if free importation of this product had been allowed, which does
not seem unreasonable.
The marginal products presented in Table 4 which were obtained from the
results of the Marcos Juarez experiments are used as estimates of nitrogen
response at the various levels of nitrogen application. These experiments
were conducted on actual farm locations under typical growing conditions
so the results should be fairly representative of what one might expect
under more widespread use of nitrogen. The results from the 50,000 plant
population trials are used. Although the 50,000 plant population may be
somewhat higher than what Argentine farmers actually harvested, it is likely
that plant population would have increased if farmers had found it profitable
to utilize nitrogen fertilizer. Also it is reasonable to believe that plant
breeders would have focused their efforts on increasing the responsiveness
of Argentine hybrids to commerical fertilizer if farmers had been using
nitrogen. As a result the figures in Table 4 probably underestimate the
nitrogen response that would have occurred under conditions of widespread
use of nitrogen.
Because the marginal product estimates in Table 4 are reported for
only three levels of nitrogen application (30, 60, and 90 kg. per ha.), the-9-
intervening figures are approximated by a freehand curve drawn through the
three observations as shown by Figure 1. However, in order to avoid an
excessive upper tail of the curve, it is ‘tchoppedoffttat the 12 kg. level
8/
as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 1. —
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reasonable to assume that all Argentine farmers always would
profit maximizing equilibrium with respect to the use of
nitrogen fertilizer. In the interest of obtaining conservative yet reason-
able estimates of the social cost, it is assumed that farmers would have
used less than the optimum amount of nitrogen for a given price ratio.-1o-
For example, the 4.8 price ratio that existed during the 1950-54 period
gives rise to about a 65 kg. per ha. optimum nitrogen application. In the
computations it is assumed that farmers used 30 kg. of nitrogen per ha.
during this period. The application level is assumed to increase by 15 kg.
per ha. during the four remaining 5-year periods, as shown in Table 5.
The additional corn production that is obtained by the application of
nitrogen is measured by the area below the nitrogen MPP curve bounded on
the right by a vertical line extending up from the quantity of nitrogen that
might have been used. This is illustrated for the 1950-54 period in Figure 1
by the entire area to the left of the line extending up from the 30 kg.
nitrogen application.
The cost of obtaining this additional output is shown by the rectangle
bounded by 4.8 and 30 on the vertical and horizontal axis respectively. With
a 4.8 price ratio the equivalent of 4.8 kg. of corn is required to purchase
(or produce) one kg. of nitrogen. Hence the cost of 30 kg. of nitrogen is
equivalent to 144 kg. of corn (30 x 4.8). The net gain to Argentina of
using the 30 kg. of nitrogen per hectare is equal to the difference between
the total output or area under the MPP curve (378 kg. of corn in this case)
minus the cost. The resulting quantity (234 kg. of corn per hectare
annually during the 1950-54 period) is represented by the shaded area in
Figure 1. The shaded area, therefore, represents the per hectare social
cost to Argentina of following a policy which made it unprofitable for
farmers to utilize nitrogen on corn. It is the net output foregone.a’
Estimates of the annual per acre loss of corn output and the annual
net social cost to Argentina over the 1950-74 period are presented in
Table 5. (To facilitate comparison with United States yields kilograms
per hectare are converted to bushels per acre.)-11-
Although these yield gains may not appear dramatic in comparison to the
44 bushel per acre yield increase that occurred in the United States between
1950-54 and 1970-74, one must bear in mind that everything is assumed
constant except the increased use of nitrogen. If more favorable price
relationships had existed in Argentina we can expect that many other
investments would have been undertaken. As mentioned, plant breeders no








Annual per Acre Loss in Corn Yield and Social Cost
Resulting from Failure to Utilize Nitrogen on Corn
(Argentina, 1950-74)
Assumed Nitrogen Yield Loss Social Cost






can expect Argentine farmers to have utilized phosphorous and potassium
fertilizer along with nitrogen. Similarly more favorable farm prices
would have made it profitable for the Argentine farm supply industry to
produce and for farmers to adopt other modern inputs including herbicides,
insecticides and irrigation facilities. More favorable prices also would
have given farmers an incentive to adopt improved cultural practices such
as soil and moisture conservation measures. It is likely that these inputs
and practices would have been complements to nitrogen, thereby shifting the
MPP curve of nitrogen to the right and increasing the output attributable
to nitrogen.-12-
Indeed it is not unreasonable to believe that under the price relation-
ships which existed in the United States, Argentine corn yields would have
kept pace with U.S. yields. As shown in Figure 2, Argentine and U.S. yields
were about equal until the late 1940?s at which time U.S. yields began a
steady climb while Argentina yields stagnated.
Although foregone yields provide an indication of losses stemming from
a so-called llcheapfoodrtpolicy, a more telling measure is the total loss in
output to the country. As shown by the total of Column two in Table 6, the
estimated loss of total corn output from 1950 to 1974 that resulted just
from the failure to utilize nitrogen fertilizer exceeded 1.7 billion bushels.
Considering that Argentina exported about 2.6 billion bushels of corn during
this entire 25 year period, the utilization of nitrogen alone could have
enabled Argentina to increase corn exports over 50 percent.
As shown by the total of the third column, the net gain to Argentina
after paying for the nitrogen would have been over 1.1 billion bushels of
corn; this is the net loss in total output to the country, or the net social
cost, just from the failure to utilize nitrogen fertilizer on corn. Even
if all the nitrogen were purchased on the world market, foreign exchange
earnings would have increased in net by the value of this 1.1 billion
bushels. Thus the argument that fertilizer could not be imported because of
a lack of foreign exchange is invalid. Foreign exchange earnings would have
been increased, not decreased, by purchasing nitrogen and other modern inputs
on the world market and selling the increased output on the world market.
It is not necessary, of course, for the increased output to be marketed in
the form of corn. The extra corn could have been converted to livestock
or poultry products. Or the same amount of corn could have been produced-13-





















1930 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Year
Sources: “Grain Production and Marketing in Argentina” U.S. Dept. of Agr.
Foreign Agricultural Service, FAS-M222, December 1970, P.9; FAO, Production
yearbook, respective years; U.S. Dept. of Agr. Crop Production, respective years.-14-
Table 6. Total Reduction in Corn Output, Net Social Cost, and Internal Rate of
Return Foregone to Argentina by Not Utilizing Nitrogen Fertilizer
Gross reduction in























with fewer conventional resources (land, labor, and capital) releasing these
resources for the production of other products, farm or nonfarm, depending
on their relative profitability.
An alternative method of presenting the social cost is to calculate the
internal rate of return (IRR) that Argentina could have obtained by allowing
10/
its farmers to invest in nitrogen fertilizer.— As indicated in the right
hand column of Table 6, the social rate of return that Argentina could have
obtained by the utilization of nitrogen on corn has averaged over 200 percent
annually over the 1950-74 period. Indeed, the rate of return has been
increasing in recent years, exceeding 350 percent annually during the 1970-74
period, because of the reduction in the real price of nitrogen and the
consequent increase in the gap between what was and what might have been.
Moreover it is not unreasonable to believe that other modern inputs would
have yielded comparable rates of return, not only in Argentina but in many
other developing countries. Rates of return of this magnitude are those
that really matter when it comes to acheiving economic growth. As long as
these countries persist in following such policies there can be little
hope of ever solving the world food problem.Footnotes
~/ See T. W. Schultz (1968) for some of the commonly held myths which attempt
to rationalize the unproductive nature of agriculture in these countries, and
the expected effect of unfavorable prices on agricultural output. The
adverse effect of unfavorable prices on agricultural output in Argentina is
documented by Fienup, Brannon, and Fender (1969), see especially pp. 353-354.
D. Gale Johnson (1975) remindsus of the continuing problem of inadequate
incentives for farmers in developing countries and observes, “What is
surprising is that there has been so little analysis of these policies
that exploit farmers and so little criticism of governments that put them
into practice” (p. 75).
y U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, ERS, Fertilizer Situation, December 1972, p. 14.
~/ U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, “Argentina: Growth Potential of the Grain
and Livestock Sectors” Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 78, May 1972,
p. 42.
g U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Crop Reporting Board, Crop production, November
1972, p.B-17 The states include Ohio, Ind., Ill., Wise., Minn., Iowa, Mo.
and Neb.
y Farm Journal, November 1975, p. 23.
g Crop Production, November issues respective years.
~1 See de Janvry (1972) for a detailed account of the effect of risk on
decisions to apply nitrogen fertilizer to corn and wheat in Argentina.g/ Theoretically the MPP curve of an input in a Cobb-Douglas production
function extends up to infinity, never reaching the vertical axis.
~/ This analysis assumes that Argentina is a price takes in the world
markets for corn and nitrogen. The assumption is not unreasonable in view
of the fact that Argentine corn exports amount to about 1.6 percent of the
world’s corn output and its imports of nitrogen fertilizer would have
amounted to about 1 percent of world nitrogen production at the 90 kg. per
ha. rate.
10/ The internal rate of return is that rate of interest which makes the —
discounted present value of the returns equal to the cost. In this case it
is assumed that the returns are forthcoming one year after the cost. Thus
c=~
(l+r)
x R where C (the cost) is the difference between the gross
reduction in output and the net social cost, R (the return) is the gross
reduction in output, and r is the internal rate of return.References
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